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THE JURY AS A POLITICAL
INSTITUTION'
JON

T THE BEGINNING

M.

VAN DYKE*

of the Chicago trial of eight men alleged to have

conspired to produce violence at the 1968 Democratic Convention,
Federal District Judge Julius J. Hoffman told the jurors that they must
always follow his instructions on matters of law. Defense lawyer
Leonard Weinglass immediately objected: "The defense will contend
that the jury is a representative of the moral conscience of the community. If there is a conflict between the judge's instructions and that
of conscience, it should obey the latter." Judge Hoffman overruled the
objection and the trial proceeded through the circus-like events that
followed.'
One of the grounds on which the jury's verdict is being appealed is
that Judge Hoffman's ruling was incorrect. The appellate court may be
troubled by the argument, but will probably dismiss the contention in
a cursory paragraph or two. Although the American jury is still praised
as a bastion of democracy, standing between oppressive governments
and the people, most of today's American judges in fact do everything
possible to emasculate the jury until the only role left for jurors is to
review the facts and then apply the law as a rubber stamp for the government.
In every criminal case in California, for instance, the jury is given
the following instruction on the limitations of its power:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

t An abridged version of this article first appeared in the March 1970 issue of
The Center Magazine, Vol. 111, No. 2, a publication of the Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. Reprinted by permission.
* Visiting Fellow at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa
Barbara, California. B.A., Yale University, 1964; J.D., Harvard University, 1967
1 N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1969, at 25, col. 1 (city ed.).
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It becomes my duty as judge to instruct
you concerning the law applicable to this
case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow
the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the
issues of fact that are presented by the
allegations in the information filed in this
court and the defendant's plea of "not
guilty." This duty you should perform uninfluenced by pity for a defendant or by
passion or prejudice against him ...
You are to be governed solely by the
evidence introduced in this trial and the
law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, public opinion or public feeling. Both the People and
the defendant have a right to demand, and
they do demand and expect, that you will
conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the
law of the case, and that you will reach a
just verdict, regardless of what the consequences may be .... 2
Appellate judges typically justify such restrictive instructions by saying that if jurors
were given greater leeway, they would be
more likely to follow their prejudices than
their consciences. If jurors were permitted
to pass upon the appropriateness of a law,
appellate judges say, then the rule of law
would be replaced by the rule of lawless3
ness.
Whatever the merits of this argument, it
is clear that American jurors have become
a docile and well regimented group. Although they retain the power to reject a
judge's instructions, at least in the sense

2 CALIFORNIA

JURY

INSTRUCTIONS,

CRIMINAL

that they will not be punished if they fail
to follow the instructions, they almost
never do.4 The prime reason jurors rarely
use their theoretical power is that they are
constantly told they have none.5 In the
case of Dr. Spock, a typical example, the
jury returned a verdict of guilty for conspiracy to violate the draft laws. One juror
later said that he felt uneasy about convicting the defendants, but felt he had no choice
but to follow the judge's instruction. "[T]he
paradox," he said, "was that I agreed
wholeheartedly with these defendants but
...I felt that technically they did break the
law."' 6 Our judicial system too often transforms conscientious jurors into machinelike fact finders who are discouraged from
passing judgment on the appropriateness of
punishment and who are asked only to
add their stamp of acquiescence to convictions. My thesis is that justice would be
better served if jurors were -told that they
have the power to act mercifully if they
decide that applying the law to the defendant's act would lead to an unjust result.
BLIND RELIANCE UPON
19TH-CENTURY
PRECEDENT

One of the peculiar aspects of the current
confrontation between those lawyers who
want to appeal to the jury's conscience and
judges who prevent such an appeal is that
the 19th-century decisions contemporary
judges cite in support of their position were

4 See generally H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE

passim (1966).

(CALJIC), No. 1, at 28.
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3 See, e.g., United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d

5 Id. at 498.

1002 (4th Cir. 1969).

6 Boston Globe, Sept. 8, 1968, at 18.

16
rendered in response to a different issue.
The most forceful advocate of limiting the
jury's function to fact-finding was Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Story. While sitting as
trial judge in a case involving the transportation of slaves along the coast of Africa,
Justice Story was presented with the argument that the jury can judge the law as
well as the facts. He conceded that the
jurors have the "physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the
court." Nonetheless, they cannot decide the
law, morally, on the basis of their own
notions or whimsy.
On the contrary, I hold it the most sacred
constitutional right of every party accused
of a crime, that the jury should respond as
to the facts, and the court as to the law.
It is the duty of the court to instruct the
jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the
jury to follow the law, as it is laid down
by the court. This is the right of every
citizen; and it is his only protection. If the
jury were at liberty to settle the law for
themselves, the effect would be, not only
that the law itself would be most uncertain, from the different views, which different juries might take of it; but in case of
error, there would be no remedy or redress
by the injured party; for the court would
not have any right to review the law as it
had been settled by the jury. .

.

. Every

person accused as a criminal has a right
to be tried according to the law of the land,
the fixed law of the land; and not by the
law as a jury may understand it, or choose,
from wantonness, or ignorance, or accidental mistake, to interpret it. If I thought
that the jury were the proper judges of the
law in criminal cases, I should hold it my
duty to abstain from the responsibility of
stating the law to them upon any such trial.
But believing, as I do, that every citizen
has a right to be tried by the law, and according to the law; that it is my privilege
and truest shield against oppression and
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wrong; I feel it my duty to state my views
fully and openly on the present occasion.,
Justice Story's language is strong, but ar
analysis of the case indicates that his reasoning should not apply to the current debates over jury nullification, i.e., the power

of the jury to refuse to apply the law. He
was dealing with an 1820 statute that provided the death penalty for any American
citizen who should "seize any negro or mulatto" with the intent of making the person
seized a slave. The defendant on trial before Story had been a sailor on a ship that
had picked up and transported a number
of slaves in Portuguese Africa. According
to the Justice, before the statute could
be applied to the defendant's acts, two
questions of interpretation had to be
resolved: (1) whether the statute applied
to mere sailors who gained no title over
slaves and no profit from their sale, and

(2) whether it applied to the transportation
of persons previously enslaved between two
points both within a country practicing
slavery. To both these questions, Story's
answer was no. His concern in depriving
the jurors of the power to interpret the law
was, therefore, to prevent them from convicting and executing the defendant out of
vengeance when he was inclined to be
merciful. He was worried about a jury
punishing for a crime that had not been
legislatively intended rather than its acting
mercifully and refusing to punish for the
violation of a statute.

The argument being made today by
lawyers defending persons who have com-

7 United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043
(No. 14,545) (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
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mitted crimes of conscience is very different
from the one facing Justice Story. Leonard
Weinglass only argued that the jurors have
the power to temper the law with mercy.
He was not saying that they had the power
to interpret the law for any purpose beyond
the confines of the courtroom. He certainly
was not arguing that the jury should be
empowered to hand down a harsher punishment than permitted under current law. If
such discretion were given to the jury, some
"patriotic" jurors would undoubtedly seek
to impose the death penalty on persons
who protest against the Vietnamese war.
Proponents of nullification are not arguing that the jury be given free reign to
create new laws or "people's crimes" in a
fashion reminiscent of Nazi Germany.
Their claim is only that the jury has the
right to mitigate existing laws, and that this
right is a basic safeguard against oppressive
or overly aggressive government.
To some extent, our judicial system already recognizes a distinction between a
jury acting vengefully and one acting mercifully. Appellate judges can reduce a sentence or refuse to uphold a conviction if
they feel a jury has imposed too harsh a
judgment on the accused. Appellate judges
are, however, prevented from reviewing a
judgment of acquittal no matter how irrational it seems. Although Story did not
specifically address himself to the jury's
right to act mercifully, he apparently could
not accept the seeming inconsistency of allowing a jury to reduce a punishment if it
could not also increase it. He felt that if the
jury's power to create laws was to be
limited, its power to nullify them also had
to be limited. Because we have recognized
that there is a clear distinction to be drawn

between a jury's mercy and its vengeance,
we should not accept uncritically Story's
arguments, based, as they were, on an inability to draw this distinction. We should
particularly be wary of applying his thoughts
on whether a jury should be told it can act
vengefully to the current controversy over
whether the jury should be told it can act
mercifully.
Justice Story's successor in leading the
judicial campaign to limit jury freedom was
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin R. Curtis.
In 1851, Justice Curtis was sitting as trial
judge in a case involving a violation of the
Fugitive Slave Act. The defendant's lawyer
began his summation to the jury by arguing: "this being a criminal case, the jury
were rightfully the judges of the law as
well as the fact."' 8 If, he continued, any of
the jurors believed the statute "to be unconstitutional, they were bound by their oaths
to disregard any direction to the contrary
which the court might give them." 9 Curtis
interrupted the argument at this point and
gave a long opinion rejecting the assertion.
Unlike Story, Justice Curtis was squarely
faced with the argument that the jury
should be allowed to act mercifully to mitigate the effect of an unjust law. Like
Justice Story, however, he refused to consider that proposition alone, and, instead,
seems to have viewed the argument as
something more-that the jurors should
have total authority to pass on the law with
the power to increase as well as decrease
the penalties to be imposed. Curtis, for
instance, cites an 1802 congressional statute

8 United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331
(No. 15,815) (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
'

Id.
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that said the decisions of the Supreme Court
shall be final. If, as he noted, the jurors
were permitted to decide questions of law,
then they could overturn decisions of the
Supreme Court; the purpose of this statute
would be subverted, and uniform interpretations of the law would not be possible. 10
In making this argument, Curtis was raising
a straw man, even within the context of his
case. The argument is certainly inapplicable
to the contentions raised by lawyers in
today's cases of conscience and protest. No
lawyer is asking that juries be allowed to
reverse a decision of the Supreme Court,
or even that any jury's decision should have
effect beyond the limits of the specific case
being tried. The contention is simply that
within one courtroom and with regard to
one set of facts, -the impaneled jurors should
have the discretion not to apply the law to
one defendant.
The rulings of Justices Story and Curtis
had wide impact throughout the country,
but each was only the decision of an individual judge and hence was only as influential as it was persuasive. In 1895, the full
Supreme Court finally considered the question and, quoting extensively from the Story
and Curtis decisions, agreed with the conclusion of the individual judges by a vote of
seven to two. The case, Sparf and Hansen v.

United States," involved two sailors accused of having thrown a comrade overboard from an American vessel near Tahiti.
The sailors were charged with murder, and
their defense was that what they did constituted only the lesser offense of manslaughter. The defendants asked the judge

10 Id. at 1334.

11 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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to tell the jurors that it was within their
power to return a verdict of either murder
or manslaughter, but the judge refused, saying there was no evidence that would support a verdict of manslaughter. The judge
conceded that it was within the power of
the jury to return a verdict of manslaughter,
but maintained that such a conclusion
would not be legally defensible. After debating among themselves, the jurors returned to the courtroom and had the following conversation with the trial judge:
JUROR. Your honor, I would like to
know ... in regard to manslaughter, as to
whether the defendants can be found guilty
of manslaughter, or that the defendants
must be found guilty [of murder] ....
COURT . . . . Murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being in the peace of
the State, with malice aforethought, either
express or implied. I defined to you what
malice was, and I assume you can recall
my definition to your minds. Manslaughter
is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice, either express or implied.
I do not consider it necessary to explain it
further. If a felonious homicide has been
committed by either of the defendants, of
which you are to be the judges from the
proof, there is nothing in this case to reduce it below the grade of murder ...
JUROR. A crime committed on the high
seas must have been murder, or can it be
manslaughter?
COURT. In a proper case, it may be
murder or it may be manslaughter, but in
this case it cannot be properly manslaughter. As I have said, if a felonious
homicide has been committed, the facts of
the case do not reduce it below murder.
Do not understand me to say that manslaughter or murder has been committed.
That is for you gentlemen to determine
from the testimony and the instructions I
have given you ...
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and uncertainty in the administration of
the criminal law. Indeed, if a jury may
rightfully disregard the direction of the
court in matter of law, and determine for
themselves what the law is in the particular
case before them, it is difficult to perceive
any legal ground upon which a verdict of
conviction can be set aside by the court as
being against law. If it be the function of
the jury to decide the law as well as the
facts-if the function of the court be only
advisory as to the law-why should the
court interfere for the protection of the
accused against what it deems an error of
the jury in matter of law. 13

JUROR. If we bring in a verdict of
guilty, that is capital punishment?
COURT. Yes.
JUROR. Then there is no other verdict
we can bring in except guilty or not guilty?
COURT. In a proper case, a verdict for
manslaughter may be rendered, as the district attorney has stated; and even in this
case you have the physical power to do so;
but as one of the tribunals of the country,
a jury is expected to be governed by law,
and the law it should receive from the
court.
JUROR. There has been a misunderstanding amongst us. Now it is clearly interpreted to us, and no doubt we can now
2
agree on certain facts.'

The majority opinion devoted 42 pages
to review earlier decisions and came to the
conclusion that because jurors cannot be
allowed to increase the penalties or create
laws on their own, they cannot be allowed
to reduce such penalties or nullify laws.
The reasoning parallels that of Justices
Story and Curtis and suffers from the same
inability to distinguish between the two
directions in which a jury can move. Even
though no one before the Court argued that
the jury should be allowed to create its
own crimes or to render stiffer punishment
than the law allows, the Court was haunted

Since Spart and Hansen, few courts

have reviewed the basis for the decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was recently presented with
a long brief on the subject in connection
with the appeal of the Catonsville Nine,
who were convicted for burning draft files
in Maryland. The court quoted briefly from
Spar! and Hansen and summarily dismissed
the argument. 14 If there are any more convincing arguments than those considered in
the 19th century, no modern court has
mentioned them. Courts today must stop
relying on the inapplicable reasoning of
Spar! and Hansen; it is clear that the distinction the Supreme Court was unable to
make in 1895 can be made.

by that specter. Since a distinction between
lowering and raising the punishment could
not be made, the Court deprived the jurors
of the power to do either. In the Court's
words:

EXAMPLES OF JURY DISCRETION
IN ENGLAND AND MARYLAND

In a number of English prosecutions for
seditious libel brought in the last half of
the 18th century, defense counsels argued

Any other rule than that indicated in the
above observations would bring confusion
13
12

Id.

at 61-62 n.1.

Id. at 101.

United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th
Cir. 1969).
14

16

230
that the judge could not limit the jurors to
deciding merely whether a document was
published by the defendant but must allow
them to decide whether the document was,
in fact, libelous. In one celebrated case,
the judge went so far as to tell the jurors
that because there was no dispute over
whether the document was published by
the defendant and because he ruled as a
matter of law that the document was libelous, they had to render a verdict of guilty.' 5
Such high-handed tactics caused an uproar,
and in 1792 after much debate, Parliament
passed Fox's Libel Act, enlarging the jury's
role in libel cases. Subsequently, considerable comment ensued as to whether this bill
merely restated previous law or created a
special exception for criminal prosecution
of libel. In either event, its effect on libel
prosecutions is clear.
The Act stated that the judge could explain the law to the jurors, but that they
were free to return either a special verdict,
responding to each factual issue and leaving
the law to the judge, or a general verdict,
simply guilty or not guilty with no explanation of how the result was reached. As a
protection against an overly aggressive jury,
the defendant could ask the judge to reverse a jury verdict of guilty, and in any
event the judge was authorized to reverse
whenever he felt that the jury's guilty verdict was unwarranted.'" The jury's right to
decide matters of law, therefore, moved in
only one direction. The jurors could decide
that the law did not apply to a defendant

15 The Dean of St. Asaph's Case, 21 Howell's
State Trials 847, 870 (1783).
16 See Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156

U.S. 51, 135 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
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when a judge thought it did, and their decision would be final. If, however, they
decided that the law did apply when the
judge thought it did not, their decision
would not be final. All the abuses which
concerned American judges in the 19th
century were foreseen and dealt with.
Another example of a system in which
the jury is given the power of mercy but not
of vengeance is present-day Maryland. The
Maryland Constitution reads: "In the trial
of all criminal cases the Jury shall be the
Judges of the Law as well as the facts
....

"17

Under this provision the following

instruction is given to the jury in every
criminal case:
Members of the Jury, this is a criminal
case and under the Constitution and the
laws of the State of Maryland in a criminal case the jury are the judges of the law
as well as of the facts in the case. So that
whatever I tell you about the law while
it is intended to be helpful to you in
reaching a just and proper verdict in the
case, it is not binding upon you as members of the jury and you may accept the
law as you apprehend it to be in the case.18
This instruction does not lead to a system
of jurors magically creating crimes out of
the blue or abusing their powers. Even
critics of jury freedom concede that in
Maryland "[clriminal trials go on with fair
success and justice." 1 9 To protect the accused against a jury that might be tempted
to act improperly, a number of safeguards

17 M. CONST. art. 15, § 5 (1951).
Is Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.l (4th
Cir. 1967).
19 Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional
Thorn, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 34, 39 (1943).

THE JURY AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION

have been built into the trial process. The
judge decides all questions concerning the
admissibility of evidence. If either party
requests the judge to do so, he must give the
jury an advisory instruction on the law. If
the trial judge thinks there is insufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict of guilty,
he is empowered to direct a verdict of acquittal. If the jury has misapplied the law
to the prejudice of the accused, the trial
judge can set the verdict aside and order a
new trial. Similarly, the Maryland Supreme
Court can review the sufficiency of the evidence if the defendant argues on appeal
20
that the jury has convicted improperly.
The defendant, therefore, has the benefit of
a jury determination on the applicability of
the law, but is protected from a jury that
21
might use its power to his detriment.

THE NECESSITY OF THE JURY?

One of the most interesting comments
that came out of the early English debates
on jury power was made by Lord Chatham
in 1770. Lord Mansfield had in several
previous cases told the jury that the judge
would determine as a matter of law whether
the publication was libelous. "This, my
lords," said Lord Chatham, "I never understood to be the law of England, but the
contrary. I always understood that the jury
were competent judges of the law as well as
the fact; and, indeed, if they were not, I

20 Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 384-85, 183 A.2d

359, 366 (1962); Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94,
108, 63 A.2d 599, 606 (1949).

21 Indiana also allows juries to pass on questions
of law, but to an even more limited degree. See
Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 747 (4th Cir.
1967).

can see no essential benefit from their institution to the community. '2 2 Lord Mansfield's view seems to have carried the day,
but Lord Chatham's point is still valid.
If we are not going to give the jury the
right to nullify the law, is the institution of
the jury worth preserving? Are jurors good
enough fact-finders that we should maintain
the institution with its huge expense and
aggravation solely to decide facts? Are
juries essential to ensure fundamental fairness in the determination of facts?
In one of the very few empirical studies
on the operation of the jury, Professors
Kalven and Zeisel report that trial judges
agree with the jury's verdict in about 78
percent of the cases; of the residue, they
favored conviction over acquittal in 19 percent of the cases and acquittal rather than
conviction in 3 percent. 23 The reasons for
the judge-jury differences include disagreements in weighing the evidence presented
(54 percent of the cases in which differences occurred), jury sentiments about the
law (29 percent) ,24 jury sentiment about

22

Quoted in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,

156 U.S. 51, 113 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
23 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 59.
24 This category by no means includes only ex-

amples of jury nullification. In addition to the
subcategory of Unpopular Law, which seems to
include some cases of actual nullification, the
broad category Jury Sentiments about the Law
also includes, according to the Kalven and Zeisel
system of classification, "[tlhe Boundaries of SelfDefense, Contributory Fault of the Victim, De

Minimis,

. . .

Defendant Has Been Punished

Enough, Punishment Threatened Is Too Severe,
Preferential Treatment, Improper Police Methods,

Inadvertent Conduct, Insanity and Intoxication,
and Crime in a Subculture." Id. at 108 n.7. In
fact, Kalven and Zeisel themselves express amaze-

ment at the infrequency of jury nullification. Id.
at 498.

16
the defendant (11

percent),

the judge's

knowledge of facts kept from the jury
(2 percent), and differences in the skill of
competing lawyers

(4 percent).

25

These

statistics indicate that the jury is somewhat
more lenient toward defendants than is the
judge, but they do not indicate that the
judge is unfair in his determination of guilt.
The judge is better able to compensate for
a weak lawyer than is the jury; he is less
susceptible to the wiles of an attractive defendant, and he is probably better able to
evaluate confusing evidence. The jury
brings no particular talent to the task of
finding facts and frequently approaches its
duty in a haphazard fashion.
In fact, during the 19th century, when
the Supreme Court was eliminating the
jury's power to question the judge's interpretations of the law, commentators began
mounting an attack on the only function
remaining to the jury, that of finding the
facts. One writer in 1885 wrote that it was
"exceptional" to see "a tolerable amount
of intelligence and competency in the jury
box." ' 26 Thirty-three years later, another
writer indicated that the debate had been
settled against the jury's ability to find facts,
saying the juror's "incompetency for the
duty required of him is no longer an open
question.1

27

Over the years, criticism of the jury's
ability has not ceased. In 1955, Glanville
Williams denounced the English jury in the

following terms:

25 Id. at 115.
26 Whitehouse, Trial by Jury, As It Is and As It
Should Be, 31 ALBANY L.J. 504, 506 (1885).
27 Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil
Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 678 (1918).
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If one proceeds by the light of reason,
there seems to be a formidable weight of
argument against the jury system. To begin
with, the twelve men and women are
chosen haphazard. There is a slight property qualification-too slight to be used as
an index of ability, if indeed the mere
possession of property can ever be so used;
on the other hand, exemption is given tc
some professional people who would seem
to be among the best qualified to serveclergymen, ministers of religion, lawyers,
doctors, dentists, chemists, justices of the
peace (as well as all ranks of the armed
forces). The subtraction of relatively intelligent classes means that it is an understatement to describe a jury, with Herbert
Spencer, as a group of twelve people of
average ignorance. There is no guarantee
that members of a particular jury may not
be quite unusually ignorant, credulous,
slow-witted, narrow-minded, biased or
temperamental. The danger of this happening is not one that can be removed by
some minor procedural adjustment; it is
inherent in the English notion of a jury
as a body chosen from the general popula28
tion at random.
And, as recently as 1968, two United States
Supreme Court Justices argued forcefully
that the jury is an inefficient and unnecessary fact-finding body:
The jury system can also be said to have
some inherent defects, which are multiplied by the emergence of the criminal law
from the relative simplicity that existed
when the jury system was devised. It is a
cumbersome process, not only imposing
great cost in time and money on both the
State and the jurors themselves, but also
contributing to delay in the machinery of
justice. Untrained jurors are presumably

28 G. WILLIAMS, TH-

(3d ed. 1963).
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less adept at reaching accurate conclusions

of fact than judges, particularly if the issues are many or complex. And it is argued
by some that trial by jury, far from increasing public respect for law impairs it: the
average man, it is said, reacts favorably
neither to the notion that matters he knows
to be complex are being decided by other
average men, nor to the way the jury sys29
tem distorts the process of adjudication.
A further reason to question the need
for the jury, if its only job is to weigh the
facts, is that very few nations use the institution. Outside the United States, only the
United Kingdom, the other Commonwealth
nations, Austria, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Greece, some Latin American coun30
tries, and some Swiss cantons use a jury.
The rest of the world apparently feels that
a judge can determine the facts just as
fairly as can a jury and, of course, much
less expensively.
Although data on the jury's ability to
evaluate evidence is less conclusive than we
might like it to be, we can say, at the very
least, that it has not been shown that jurors
are better fact-finders than judges, and
quite probably they are worse. Why then
do we impanel some 1,000,000 jurors in
80,000 criminal trials and an untold additional number in civil trials each year? Are
we throwing away our money because of
some unfounded illusion? Or do we preserve the jury because, though we will not
admit it, we really want the jury to do more
than find facts?

391 U.S. 145, 188-89
(1968) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting).
30 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 13-

29 Duncan v. Louisiana,

14 n.3.

THE JURY'S STATUS AS A RESULT
OF

Duncan

AND

Witherspoon

Striking examples of the difference between the rhetoric applied to juries and the
real goals that lie behind our continuing
adherence to the jury system can be found
in two cases decided by the Supreme Court
in the spring of 1968. In Duncan v. Louisiana,31 the Supreme Court ruled that the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Court's introductory remarks
concerned the value of the jury in ensuring
a "fair trial," and characterized the jury
as being "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice. '3 2 However, in the course
of the opinion, it becomes clear that the
real importance of the jury does not lie in
its finding of fact but in its political role.
Writing for the majority, Justice White gave
the following justification for the jury:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which
law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government. Those who
wrote our constitutions knew from history
and experience that it was necessary to
protect against unfounded criminal charges
brought to eliminate enemies and against
judges too responsive to the voice of higher
authority. The framers of the constitutions
strove to create an independent judiciary
but insisted upon further protection against
arbitrary action. Providing an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against

31 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
32 Id. at 149.
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the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.
Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the
Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of
official power-a reluctance to entrust
plenary powers over the life and liberty of
the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Government
in other respects, found expression in the
criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination
of guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury
trial in serious criminal cases as a defense
against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies
for protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
must therefore be respected by the States. 33
The majority's view of the jury as more
than just a fact-finding body is particularly
evident when compared to the dissenter's
philosophy. Justice Harlan, who thinks of
the jury only as a finder of facts, branded it
an outmoded institution.3 4 The majority
focused upon the political role the jury has
played historically and found it to be an
"inestimable safeguard."
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nificantly, almost all the men who authored
those documents favored jury nullification.
The Court would thus be acting hypocritically if it adopted our founding fathers'
affection for the jury, but refused to accept
the real reason which led these men to
value the jury so highly.
America's leaders at the time the nation
was being formed argued repeatedly and
forcefully for the principle of jury nullification. For instance, in 1771 John Adams
said that it is not only the right of the
juror, "but his duty . . . to find the verdic.
according to his own best understanding
judgment, and conscience, though in direct
3' 5
opposition to the direction of the court.
Alexander Hamilton said in 1804 that in
criminal cases the jury's duty is to acquit,
despite the instructions of the judge, "if
[in] exercising their judgment with discretion and honesty they have a clear conviction that the charge of the court is
wrong."'3 6 Perhaps more significantly, the
first Chief Justice of the United States,
John Jay, recognized the need to tell a
jury it had the power to ignore judicial
instructions. In a jury trial before the full
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jay told the
jurors:
It may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to

Although the majority did not explicitly
state that juries should be encouraged to
play a greater role in questioning the law,
its reasoning leads to that conclusion. The
White'opinion quotes extensively from the
first official documents of this country; sig-

33
34

Id. at 155-56.
See excerpts from Justice Harlan's

id. at 188-89.

opinion,

remind you of the good old rule that on
questions of fact, it is the province of the
jury, on questions of law it is the province

35 Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S.
51, 144 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (quoting
2 JOHN ADAMS' WORKS 253-55).
3 6 156 U.S. at 148 (Gray, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Croswell, 3 Johns Cas. 337, 361-62
(N.Y. 1804)). See generally Sax, Conscience and

Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57
YALE REv. 481, 483-87 (1968).
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of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognises this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a right to
take upon yourselves to judge of both, and
to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy. On this, and on every other
occasion, however, we have no doubt, you
will pay that respect which is due to the
opinion of the court: for as, on the one
hand, it is presumed, that juries are the
best judges of facts; it is, on the other
hand, presumable, that the courts are
the best judges of law. But still, both objects are lawfully within your power of
37
decision.
In Duncan, the Court did not refer to
these early affirmations of the principle of
jury nullification. One cannot help but feel,
however, that the Court believed that a
fairly constituted jury passing on Duncan's
alleged crime would have exercised its political power of nullification as advocated
by the country's early leaders. Gary
Duncan, a black 19 year-old, was given a
60-day jail sentence because he jostled a
white youth after a discussion in which
Duncan attempted to act as peacemaker
between whites and blacks. A represen-

tative jury, containing blacks as well as
whites, might well have refused to send
38
Duncan to jail for this act.
A second Supreme Court decision,
Witherspoon v. Illinois,39 rendered two
weeks after Duncan, confirmed the notion
that the Court is conscious of the jury's
political role and is willing to strengthen

37 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 1, 4
(1794).
38 See generally Note, Trial by Jury in Criminal
Cases, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 419-32 (1969).
39 391 U.S. 510 (1968).

that role. Witherspoon was sentenced to
death by a jury from which all persons who
harbored any doubt over imposing the
death penalty were excluded. This procedure followed an Illinois statute that said
the judge should excuse every juror who
states that "he has conscientious scruples
against capital punishment or that he is
opposed to the same." ' 40 The statute was

clearly designed to ensure that juries in
capital cases would return the death penalty
as often as possible.
The Supreme Court's refusal to allow
this result is ostensibly based on the need
for a fair and impartial jury. The Court's
concluding paragraph, for instance, states:
Whatever else might be said of capital
punishment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be
squared with the Constitution. The State
of Illinois has stacked the deck against the
petitioner. To execute this death sentence
would deprive him of his life without due
4
process of law.

1

This language confuses the real issue in the
case. The Court refuses to condemn a
statute that would call for an automatic
death penalty if a given crime were committed. 42 Illinois by specific statutory language attempted to achieve an almost
automatic death penalty by excluding all
scrupulous jurors from capital cases. If the
Court were concerned only about a fair
and impartial verdict, it would not have

391 U.S. at 512 (quoting ILL.
38, § 115-4(d) (Supp. 1967)).
40

41
42

Id. at 523.
Id. at 519 n.15.
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condemned Illinois' chosen way of achiev43
ing such a verdict.
Furthermore, the Court was not saying
that a fair and impartial jury can only be
one containing persons of all shades of
opinion, because the exclusion of persons
who could never impose the death penalty
is allowed. If the Court felt that the conscience of the community could only be
expressed by a jury from which no one is
excluded, then it would be obliged to allow
no exclusions for cause. To make sense of
the Witherspoon opinion, it is necessary to
view the Court's real concern as something
much broader. The Court must feel that it
is the essence of a jury trial that a jury be
able to exercise its power of nullification,
subject of course to each juror's willingness
at least to pay respectful attention to the
law as ordained by the legislature and as
explained by the Court.
The most telling clue to the Supreme
Court's view of the jury's role is contained
in the following passage:
[O]ne of the most important functions any
jury can perform in making such a selection [between life and death] is to maintain
a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of punishment
could hardly reflect "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a
44
maturing society."
If the jury is to maintain this link, then it
must be given the authority to reject judicial instructions when they conflict with

43
44

Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 519 n.15.
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the values of the community. Justice Black
in a dissenting opinion criticized the Court
for ignoring the decision made by the
Illinois Legislature that a jury in a capital
case should be biased toward capital punishment, and that the jury should not be
encouraged to nullify the legislature's decision. It is conceivable that the majority did
mistakenly fail to consider the intent of the
Illinois Legislature, but it is much more
likely that they believed it to be an unconstitutional act for a legislature to deprive a
jury of its power to nullify, since such a
power is inherent in the American concept
of a jury. The Court tempered the jury's
power of nullification by demanding that
each juror be willing to say that he would
at least consider imposing the penalty desired by the legislature and by allowing the
exclusion of those prospective jurors who
had formulated a firm and unyielding determination to disobey the law. Only Justice
Douglas would go one step further and say
that even those persons unalterably opposed
to the death penalty should be allowed to
participate in the determination of whether
45
the death penalty should be imposed.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Another noteworthy event took place in
1968 that appears to acknowledge the jury's
political role. Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act 46 to ensure that
juries in federal courts represent a true cross
section of the community. This recent development parallels the thinking of the coun-

45 See generally Note, supra note 38, at 432-49.
46 Act of Mar. 27, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274,

82 Stat. 53.
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try's early leaders, who said that in all criminal cases the jury must be drawn from "the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall
'47
have been previously ascertained by law."
It has never been asserted that persons from
one district or from one part of town are
any better at sifting evidence and arriving
at facts than those from another district or
another part of town. Persons in the local
area, and, in particular, persons representing the defendant's community are, however, more likely to be sensitive to the
significance of the crime and the appropriateness of applying the law to the defendant's act. Both the constitutional provision
and the 1968 bill are, therefore, based on
a national determination that every criminal
defendant should have the benefit of the
local community's feeling on the crime.
Furthermore, if the local consensus is to
be heard, the jury must realize that their
job is more than just a conscience-less
application of law to fact.
It is difficult to predict what the lower
courts will do in light of these recent
decisions and statutes; but at least one
court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, seems to have moved in
the direction of acknowledging and respecting, if not directly encouraging, the jury's
power to nullify laws. The trial judge, in the
prosecution of Doctor Spock and four
others, asked the jury, in addition to the
general issue of guilt, ten special questions
to be answered "Yes" or "No." The court
of appeals criticized this action in strong
language:

In a criminal case a court may not order
the jury to return a verdict of guilty, no
matter how overwhelming the evidence of
guilt. This principle is so well established
that its basis is not normally a matter of
discussion. There is, however, a deep undercurrent of reasons. Put simply, the right
to be tried by a jury of one's peers finally
exacted from the king would be meaningless if the king's judges could call the turn.
Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.
1670). In the exercise of its functions not
only must the jury be free from direct control in its verdict, but it must be free from
judicial pressure, both contemporaneous
48
and subsequent.
A little later, the court stated:
[T]he jury, as the conscience of the community must be permitted to look at more
than logic. . . . If it were otherwise there
would be no more reason why a verdict
should not be directed against a defendant
in a criminal case than in a civil one. The
constitutional guarantees of due process
and trial by jury require that a criminal
defendant be afforded the full protection
of a jury unfettered, directly or indirectly. 49
The court did not go so far as to say
that the jury must be told that it has the
power to nullify the law. However, by
saying that the jury must be "unfettered,"
the Court seems to be saying at least that
the trial judge should not tell the jury they
must always follow his instructions on the
law.
Other courts have been moving much
more cautiously toward extension of the
jury's power to nullify, or at least in in-

United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-81
(Ist Cir. 1969).
49 Id. at 182.
48

47 U.S.

CONST.

amend. VI.
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forming the jury of its power, 10 because
there are some troubling problems in this

area for which there ar- no obvious
answers. In light of these problems, it may
be justifiable for an appellate court to act

on a case-by-case basis instead of through
announcement of a sweeping new doctrine.
CRIMES OF CONSCIENCE AND
CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

One problem is whether the jury's power
to nullify should apply equally to crimes of
violence as well as to crimes of conscience.
Certainly the need for the power seems
more evident in crimes of conscience, and
it is in this realm that most of the debate
over jury nullification has taken place. In

a case of conscience, the defendant is being
prosecuted because he has protested against
a policy of the state. The victims of the
crime are the persons who are in power at
the time and who are making policy for the
government; cases of seditious libel and

draft card burning are obvious examples.
The jury stands between the policy-makers
and the defendant and consequently can
repudiate the state's policy with a verdict of
acquittal.
Some commentators, worried about
southern juries that have acquitted white
defendants despite strong evidence that the

defendants killed black persons, have
argued that juries should not be told they
have the power to nullify in a trial involving
a violent crime. There are at least two
answers to this contention. First, southern

juries acquit white defendants even without
50
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being told they have the power to do so,
and there is no evidence that they would
acquit more often if they were explicitly
told they had the power. The passage of
Fox's Libel Law in 1792 did not, for
instance, make it significantly more difficult
for the English Government to obtain criminal convictions. 5 1 Second, the solution to
the problem of southern juries is not to
deprive them of their power to nullify but
to make them more representative of the
community, i.e., to have more black citizens
on the jury rolls.
In a non-southern context, juries will
not ordinarily be tempted to exercise their
power to nullify the law in a crime of
violence. The jury is unlikely to ignore the
law and the judge's instructions, because
the people-and the jurors as representatives of the people-are the victims of these
crimes. There are times, however, when the
power to nullify becomes important with
regard to a crime of violence. Juries have
recurringly nullified the law by acquitting
a defendant charged with murder when the
evidence shows that he ended the life of a
relative or patient whose suffering from an
incurable illness had become unendurable.
Most appellate courts have therefore recognized that the concept of jury nullification
should apply to crimes of violence if it
applies at all, as is evidenced by Spar! and
Hansen, Duncan, and Witherspoon, all in-

volving acts of violence.
Another argument that has been raised
against informing the jury of its powers
of nullification is that a jury might use this
power in reverse, i.e., to create laws of its

See, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp.

520, 523-24 (D.C. Mass. 1968).

1970

51 See Sax, supra note 36, at 491-92.
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own under which a defendant is convicted.
As noted earlier,52 this was the argument
raised by Justices Story and Curtis and the
majority in Sparf and Hansen; an argument
which is, to a large extent, phony since ap-

pellate courts can reverse the jury's conviction if the verdict is unsupported by facts
and reason. There is, however, a small area
within which the jury can create "law" to
support a conviction and which cannot be
reviewed by an appellate court.
The Huey Newton trial in 1968 offers
a ready example. Newton was charged with

first degree murder for killing an Oakland
policeman. The prosecution argued that
Newton killed the officer deliberately and
maliciously. The defense was that the victim
was killed by another policeman also involved in the fracas. There was some evidence to support the prosecutor's version,
which would have justified a conviction of
first degree murder if accepted by the jury,
and there was some evidence to support
Newton's contention, which if accepted by
the jury would justify total acquittal. There
was a little evidence to support a middle
ground, i.e., that Newton shot the policeman in a fit of passion after being provoked.
Such a factual theory supports a verdict of
voluntary manslaughter, which carries a
sentence in California of up to 14 years.
Although neither side argued for this result, the jury returned a verdict of voluntary
53
manslaughter.
There are two plausible explanations of

52 See pages 226-29 supra.
53 In May 1970, the California Court of Appeals

reversed Newton's conviction on a ground unrelated to this discussion. People v. Newton, 8
Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).

what transpired. The jury may have thought
that Newton deliberately and maliciously
killed the policeman, but that in the context of continuous police harassment of
the Black Panthers in Oakland, such an act
was in some respects justifiable. Under this
view, the jury tempered the law with mercy.
On the other hand, the jury may not have
been convinced that Newton shot the
policeman but felt he was sufficiently dangerous that some sort of punishment was in
order. In this situation, the jury was creating a vague crime for the purpose of
punishing Newton, more or less on their
own initiative. Under either view, the jurors
are making a distinction not recognized by
the "law" as given to them by the judge,
and are thus acting as a political and not
merely a fact-finding institution.
To those persons that object to this kind
of political initiative on the part of the
jury and argue that the jury should not be
told it has any political power, three
answers can be given. First, juries use this
power without being told. The Newton
example is real, and many more could be
listed. Whenever juries seem troubled over
a case, they seem to turn eagerly for a
compromise solution. There is no indication
that this practice would increase dramatically if the jurors were expressly told they
had this power. Second, compromise solutions may in some sense be justifiable. The
jury is making a distinction that the law has
not recognized, but it may be one that a
legislator would recognize if faced with the
specific example before the jury. Finally,
the jury's discretion to make ad hoc laws
is carefully circumscribed within an area
allowed by the prosecutor and the trial and
appellate judges. A person charged with

16
malicious mischief cannot, for instance, be
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon,
since that would be beyond the bounds of
the prosecutor's indictment and the judge's
instructions. The occasions for abuse, therefore, will be limited.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to cover some three centuries of debates, to apply historical arguments to the controversies of today,
and in the process, the thrust of my argument may have become lost. I contend
that the only justification for the jury, an
inefficient fact-finding body at best, is that
it serves as an additional safeguard to persons accused of committing a crime. Whenever a criminal act occurs, the policeman
investigating the matter has discretion
whether to make an arrest. If an arrest is
made, the prosecutor has discretion to bring
the matter to court or not. The trial judge
then has discretion to allow the matter to
be brought into his court or not. Each of
these public officials knows of his discretion and usually uses it with the understanding that he is acting for the public.
The jury is also acting on behalf of the
public, and it also has discretion in deciding
whether to convict the accused. The jury,
however, usually does not know it has this
discretion, and hence in many cases the
accused is deprived of one of his safeguards.
There are three types of situations when
the added safeguard of jury discretion is
particularly important: (1) the prosecutor
may be overzealous in bringing a prosecution because a particularly prominent or
controversial person is involved or because
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of some personal relationship he has to one
of the parties; (2) the trial judge may not
be able to view the case objectively because
of some personal eccentricity or deep-seated
bias; 54 and (3) the government may be the
victim of the crime in a way that makes it
impossible for the prosecutor not to prosecute or for the judge to dismiss the matter.
In each of these three situations, but
most particularly in the third, the jury can
act mercifully when the policeman, the
prosecutor and judge are unable to be merciful, because the jury will not be called to
answer for its acts. As Judge Learned Hand
put it,
[t]he institution of trial by jury--especially
in criminal cases-has its hold upon public
favor chiefly for two reasons. The individual can forfeit his liberty-to say nothing
of his life-only at the hands of those who,
unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they
do, and who at once separate and melt
anonymously in the community from
which they came. Moreover, since if they
acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely
to suffer of whose conduct they do not
morally disapprove; and this introduces a
slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of
current ethical conventions. A trial by any
jury, however small, preserves both these
fundamental elements and a trial by a
judge preserves neither, at least to anything like the same degree. 55
Some jurors are aware of their power to
nullify or bend the law and others act unconsciously to reach compromises that the

See references to these two problems in Duncan, notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
55 United States v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76
(2d Cir. 1942).
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law permits but does not encourage. Many
jurors are not aware of this power, however, and do not review an accusation in a
discretionary way to decide whether it is
appropriate to convict the accused before
them. The defendant is then inadequately
protected against injustices.
Jurors should not therefore be told by
the trial judge, as they are told in California and in almost every other jurisdiction,
that "it is your duty as jurors to follow the
law as I shall state it to you."5'6 Jurors should
instead be told that although they are a
public body bound to give respectful attention to the laws, they have the final authority to decide whether or not to apply
a given law to the acts of the defendant on
trial before them. More explicitly, jurors
should be told that they represent their
communities and that it is appropriate to

56 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.

bring into their deliberations the feelings
of the community and their own feelings
based on conscience. Finally, they should
be told that despite their respect for the law,
nothing would bar them from acquitting
the defendant if they feel that the law, as
applied to the fact situation before them,
would produce an inequitable or unjust
result.
Such an instruction will not result in
men picking and choosing with impunity
the laws they will obey or disobey. Most
jurors, because they were among those who
elected the legislators who passed the laws,
will apply the law as written to the facts of
the case. In some cases, however, they will
conclude that the legislators could not have
intended the law to apply to their set of
facts, or that it is time to review the wisdom
of the law, and they will acquit a person
who has broken a law. This is an important
safeguard that should be recognized and
strengthened.

